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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Claimant Gordon A. Gray by this appeal seeks review of 
', i ''ion of the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission 
JI utah denying Appellant unemployment compensation benefits 
l-'ursuant to Utah Code Ann. §35-4-4(c) (1953, as amended) for 
failure to meet work search requirements for eligibility. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
On September 29, 1982, the Utah Department of 
Employment Security sent Appellant notice that he had failed to 
make an adequate work search effort and denied him unemployment 
compensation benefits retroactively to August 29, 1892, with an 
overpayment liability assessment of $498. 00. On November 9, 
1982, after a 4 1/2 hour hearing on the matter, Senior Appeals 
Referee Shonnie B. Passey rendered her decision which modified 
the Department of Employment Security's decision by denying 
benefits from August 29 through October 30, 1982, with the 
exception of the weeks ending October 9 and 16, 1982. The 
overpayment liability of $498.00 was upheld. The Appeals 
Referee reopened the hearing on November 17, 1982, and modified 
her prior decision so that benefits would once again be allowed 
effective October 24, 1982. She also modified the overpayment 
liability of $498.00 up to $664.00. 
on January 18, 1983, the Board of Review of the 
Industrial Commission reversed in part and affirmed in part the 
referee's decision. The Board affirmed the denial of benefits 
for the period August 29 through October 2, 1982, with the 
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exception of the calendar week ending Se[-'tcembcr 1982, ,; 
which benefits were allowed. Benefits were denied tor t'"1P ,-
ending October 9, 1982, and October 1982, but all,,,, 
the week ending October 16, 19 8 2. Appellant's over«.; 
liability was modified down to $498.00. This 
overpayment was offset by valid claims filed October 16, 311, 
November 6, 1982. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant asks the Court to reverse Responden: 
decision that Appellant failed to make an active work sea:. 
effort. Appellant further asks the Court to enter a 
that Respondent's decision was not supported by substant 
evidence and was not in compliance with Utah law. Fir.a:. 
Appellant asks that the Court find that he is entitled 
unemployment compensation benefits from August 29, 1982, 
he is no longer otherwise eligible and that therefore, as 
matter of law, no unemployment compensation benefits received 
Appellant after October 29, 1982, were overpayments. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The Department of Employment Security issued 
decision dated September 29, 1982, (R. 160) denying Appe;i' 
Gordon A. Gray unemployment compensation insurance bene: 
effective August 29, 1982, on the grounds the Appellant h• 
made an active job search effort. Appellant had been cal 
for an eligibility review on September 27, 1982, 
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Appellant listed the names of three 
,
0 1m,J nyers whom he had contacted in person and by telephone 
·, 1, l 110 September. 
;,
1
w1°l lant 
Benefits" 
Gray to 
(R. 163) 
Following the conversation, Dean asked 
sign 
which 
a "Statement Regarding Claims for 
Dean had authored. That statement 
indicated that "benefits could be denied" if Appellant didn't 
make the required number of contacts. Two days later, Appellant 
was sent an "Eligibility Determination and Overpayment Notice" 
(R. 160) signed by "V. Byrd" denying benefits beginning August 
29, 1982, and assessing an overpayment of $498.00 for the weeks 
ending September 4, 11, and 18, 1982. 
Appellant Gray received his last benefit check during 
the week ending October 2, 1982, for the prior weeks claim. 
On October 1, 1982, Appellant requested a hearing. 
Appellant received a hearing November 3, 1982, which hearing 
lasted approximately 4 1I2 hours. During the hearing he was 
examined and cross-examined as to every single job contact he 
had made since August 29, 1982. 
In a decision dated November 9, 1982, (R. 43-48) 
Appeals Referee Shonnie B. Passey affirmed the decision of the 
Department representative in denying benefits from August 29, 
1982, through October 30, 1982. However she modified the prior 
decision to allow benefits for the weeks ending October 9 and 
16, 1982. 
The Appeals Referee found that Appellant's telephone 
contacts were generally insufficient and that Gray was required 
to contact at least two new potential employers in person every 
- 3 -
week. She further found that Appellant Grciy was not "''. 
fault in creating the overpayment and required 
overpayment of $498.00 be offset by withholding 
Appellant's weekly benefit amount. 
The Appeals Referee re-opened the hearing NovemLc 
1982, to receive additional testimony from the Appc;·. 
regarding his job search efforts during the weeks of Octobet 
1982, and November 8, 1982. (R. 41-42) The Appeals Refecc 
amended her prior decision to find that the disqualificat: 
period terminated October 23, 1982, and allowed beneL· 
effective October 24, 1982. The Appeals Referee further amenr' 
her prior decision to find that the overpayment was not $498. 
but $664.00. 
On October 1, 1982, Appellant filed an appeal fromt: 
decision of the Appeals Referee to the Board of Review of 
Industrial Commission. (R. 39-40) In its decision (R. 12-13) t' 
Board affirmed and adopted the findings of fact in the dec1s;: 
by the Appeals Referee with respect to the denial of benef;· 
for the period August 29 through October 2, 1982, with t 
exception of the calendar week ending September 25, 1982, 
which the Board allowed benefits. The Board also modified 
Referee's decision by denying benefits for the week er.d. 
October 9, 1982. 
The Board of Review noted that for the calendar ""' 
ending September 25, 1982, Appellant had made one in-per 
employer contact, supplemented by telephone contacts. H1·1··' 
he had only made telephone contacts for the week ending Oc' ' 
- 4 -
J, «1 :'., which the Board held were not sufficient to establish 
an active work search effort. 
The modifications made by the Board of Review resulted 
"' .1 reduction of Appellant's overpayment liability from $664.00 
t0 $498.00, which the Board found had been offset by valid 
claims filed for the weeks ending October 16, 30, and November 
6, 1982, thus taking a 100% set off. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant Gordon A. Gray is a welder and steel worker 
having worked in the industry for over nine years. (R. 128) 
Through his work he has become a highly skilled welder. (R. 130) 
Through additional training, he has received certificates 
qualifying him to perform specialized work. (R. 127) During his 
lengthy testimony before the Appeals Referee, he established 
that from August 29 to October 30, 1982, he made 48 job 
contacts, 38 of which were made by telephone. To generalize, 
his basic approach was to contact a potential employer either by 
telephone or in person and fill out an application if permitted. 
After that, he would continue to contact these companies on a 
regular basis, generally by telephone. Often the companies 
themselves would request that he call them periodically to check 
back. Gray had worked for several of these employers before. 
They were therefore personally familiar with him and the quality 
of his work; those companies were Williamson Trucking (R. 66), 
Mark Steel (R. 61), Allen Steel (R. 65), and O.J. Industries 
(R. 54). 
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Appellant Gray continued to broaden his 
checking with new potential employers as well as keep' 
contact with his "good prospects." Much of this was 
the telephone. Gray testified that he felt the company 1,, 
"open the door" first. When he would call he would ask if t 
had any openings or were taking applications. If the answer 
a strong no, he would not attempt to contact them in person. 
the "door" was open or even ajar, he would go to the ernploye. 
office and submit his application, 
Appellant reminded the Department 
or speak with the foren1;, 
that he had worked in '.' 
industry for 9 years and knows how to get jobs. He 
successfully in the past following precisely the met::: 
identified above. Until recently, he has not been unernploye 
Often he has worked two jobs when necessary to better '. 
quality of life for his family. 
in finding work in the industry. 
He feels that he is an exee: 
Yet as is common knowledge, this country is expe:. 
encing the highest unemployment rate since the Great Depress1r, 
and Gordon Gray is clearly a victim of this. Construct1: 
trades and heavy industry are extremely depressed and jobs ''I 
scarce. 
After Appellant received his last benefit check 
October 2, 1982, in-person contacts became nearly 
his family was without any income, or savings. They 
already behind in house payments, furniture payments, and ,: 
bills, and he had no money to buy gas for his motorcycle. 
contacts thereafter were almost entirely telephone cont' 
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except for the week ending October 16, 1982. In that week, Gray 
1 .• ,rrowed money from relatives in order buy gas to look for work. 
! 1: ·;9) In that week he made 6 job contacts, 5 of which were 
"'"'" and in-person. (R. 79, 80, 81) He even drove to Mercur, 
Utah to check with Anaconda Copper about jobs. (R. 72) 
The specific job contacts made by Appellant are well 
documented in the record. Appellant believes it would be 
helpful to tally all the job contacts made during the time 
period in question, as the hearing examiner disregarded return 
calls made to previously contacted employers. 
Week Ending Date 
August 29 - September 4 
September 4 - September 18 
(2 weeks) 
September 19 - September 25 
September 26 - October 2 
October 3 - October 9 
October 10 - October 16 
October 17 - October 23 
October 24 - October 30 
- 7 -
Contacts Made 
1 in-person 
9 contacts 
6 new 
4 in-person 
5 by telephone 
6 contacts 
4 new 
6 by telephone 
6 contacts 
3 new 
6 by telephone 
9 contacts 
7 new 
9 by telephone 
6 contacts 
5 new 
5 in-person 
1 by telephone 
4 contacts 
1 new 
4 by telephone 
7 contacts 
7 new 
7 by telephone 
Total Contacts: 48 
Average Contacts per weeK: 5. J 
This was not the extent of Appellant Gray's JOt 
however. He testified that he checked the skills board a' 
Job Service building "once or twice a week" and checked thE 
ads in the newspaper daily. He learned of some job prosr' 
from friends (R. 79) and relatives and fellow church memJJe: 
(R. 73, 78) He has even checked with the newspaper circula' .. 
department to see if he could get a paper route. He attende: 
job placement seminar at Job Service even though he was 
required to do so. (R. 123) Gray feels that these other 
search activities should be considered along with his empl: 
contacts in determining his eligibility for benefits. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1) Did Appellant act in good faith to make an ac .. 
and reasonable effort to secure employment? 
2) Is the "2 to 3 new, in-person contact ru!E 
valid legal standard? 
3) Was the offset of Appellant's weekly be:e 
amount excessive under the circumstances? 
4) Does the Amendment 
recipients of Utah unemployment compensation 
afforded a Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) 
to being deprived of such payments? 
- 8 -
require 
benefit' 
hear :ng -
ARGUMENT 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW'S DETERMINATION IS NOT 
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, IS ARBITRARY 
AND CAPRICIOUS AND IS CONTRARY TO LAW. 
POINT I. 
APPELLANT CONDUCTED A DILIGENT JOB SEARCH. 
Utah law provides that: 
An unemployed individual shall be 
eligible to receive benefits with 
respect to any week only if it has been 
found by the commission that: 
( c) He is able to work and is 
available for work during each and 
every week with respect to which he 
made a claim for benefits under this 
Act, and acted in good faith in an 
active effort to secure employment, ... 
Utah Code Ann. §35-4-4 (1953, as amended) (emphasis added). 
Utah law further clarifies the manner in which this 
requirement is to be interpreted and imposed in the next section 
of the Code, Ineligibility for benefits: 
An individual shall be ineligible 
for benefits or for purposes of 
establishing a waiting period: 
Failure to Apply for or Accept Work. 
(c) If the commission finds that 
the claimant has failed without good 
cause to properly apply for available 
suitable work ... provided no claimant 
shall be ineligible for benefits for 
failure to apply, accept a referral, or 
accept suitable work under 
circumstances of such a nature that it 
would be contrary to equity and good 
conscience to impose a 
disqualification. 
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The commission shall consider the 
purposes of this act, the reasonable-
ness of the claimant's actions, and the 
extent to which the actions evidence a 
genuine continuing attachment to the 
labor market in reaching a determin-
ation of whether the ineligibility of a 
claimant is contrary to equity and good 
conscience. 
Utah Code Ann. §35-3-5 (c) , ( 1953, as amended). 
As noted above, in determining whether or not 
has failed without good cause to properly apply for availc 
suitable work, the commission must take into considerat: 
among other factors, the "purposes of this act." U.C.A. §JS 
states this public policy and purpose: 
As a guide to the interpretation 
and application of this act, the public 
policy of this state is declared to be 
as follows: Economic insecurity due to 
unemployment is a serious menace to the 
health, morals, and welfare of the 
people of this state. Unemployment is 
therefore a subject of general interest 
and concern which requires appropriate 
action by the legislature to prevent 
its spread and to lighten its burden 
which now so often falls with crushing 
force upon the unemployed worker and 
his family. The achievement of Social 
Security requires protection against 
this greatest hazard of our economic 
life.... The legislature, therefore, 
declares that in its considered 
judgment the public good, and the 
general welfare of the citizens of this 
state require the enactment of this 
measure .... 
It has since been held, that this Act, being 
in nature should be liberally construed. Singer Sewing M<:.:_ 
Co. v. Industrial Comm. 134 P.2d 479 (Utah, 1943) reh.den. 
P.2d 694 (Utah 1943). The Act should be 
- 10 -
pffpctuate its purposes, which include lightening the burdens of 
, 1 oyrnen t and maintaining purchasing power in the economy. 
;unnson v. Board of Review of Industrial Corrun., 320 P.2d 315 
(Utah 1958). 
The remedial purpose of the Act was further stated in 
Singer Sewing Machine, supra, to protect the health, morals, and 
welfare of the people by providing a cushion against the shocks 
and rigors of unemployment. The purpose of providing benefits 
was defined as twofold: First, to alleviate the need of the 
worker and his family who found no market for their services, 
and were deprived of wages by the general business collapse; 
Second, to provide increased buying power through pump-priming, 
and, thereby, to stimulate our economic system. Lexes v. 
Industrial Corrun., 243 P.2d 964 (Utah 1952). 
It is clear from the words of the statute and the 
purpose of the Act that the law requires a subjective analysis 
of the individual claimant's acts. The statute requires the 
claimant to act in "good faith in an active effort to secure 
employment." 
This is further clarified in the case law. The Utah 
Supreme Court held in the case of Denby v. Board of Review, 567 
P.2d 626 (Utah 1977) that the claimant "must act in good faith 
to make an active and reasonable effort to secure employment, 
and must be genuinely attached to the labor market." Id. at 
628. This principle has not changed. The words "good faith" 
and "reasonable effort" imply a subjective individualized 
analysis of the claimants' job search efforts. The law does not 
- 11 -
require the "2 to 3 new, in i:ierson contacts" imposed 
Appeals Referee. In the matter 
82-A-4423 at 4 (November 9, 1982) 
Utah, Department of Employment 
of Gordon A. Grav, ca, 
(The Industrial Comrnisc,-
Security, Appeals Sect 
Decision of Appeals Referee Shonnie B. Passey.) (R. 43-48) 
Nor is the test whether or not Appellant Gray 
doing the absolute best possible type of job search. The ; 
that Gray did not make a resume to staple to the front of, 
application, nor go in person to all his contacts is -
operative. This does not reach the issue of "good faith" 
"reasonable efforts." These points may serve as helpful 
to those seeking work but it is not required by the law. 
Appellant's testimony was inherently believable, r 
was found credible by the Appeals Referee. From his testimc 
and job search list, he has provided a wealth of informatioo 
each employer; Appellant not only indicated the name of t 
person he spoke with and their response, but added inforrnati: 
about what jobs they had going, what contracts they 
expecting, their financial circumstances, as well as ob 
information about 
with them at some 
the company. It is clear that Gray tal<c 
length to try to learn what his chances ',,,,, 
and what the company's needs may be. 
Appellant testified that his basic method was 
contact the company, either by telephone or in person, fill 
an application if permitted, and then continue calling them< 
weekly basis. Often the companies would ask him to do > 
that. The Department has found that these return conu:-
- 12 -
;0mehcw did '."lot count as they were not "new." The question 
uld have been whether these return calls were reasonable and 
roarle in good faith. 
The Department is encouraging individuals to hold back 
on their efforts by such a practice. In a small specialized 
field as is steel fabrication, there may be only 20-30 potential 
employers. If all were contacted within the first month of 
unemployment, the Appellant could never make another "new" 
contact in his field. The absurdity of this result illustrates 
the problem with the Department's position. This is precisely 
why the 2 to 3 new in-person contact rule is impractical. It 
leads to unfair and inequitable results. Furthermore, it 
eliminates the need for individual analysis of each Appellant's 
circumstances. The rule reduces the Appeals Referee's job to 
that of a computer, merely counting the number of new, in-person 
contacts, just as Shonnie Passey has done on page 3 of her 
decision. (R. 45) Such was not the intent of the legislature 
nor is it the legal requirement. 
Appellant testified that the door must be first opened 
to him. When he would call an employer, often he would be 
advised of recent layoffs and financial woes. He would be 
discouraged by the companies from making a personal visit. 
Appellant submits that such telephone contacts were reasonable 
in todays economy. This is especially true later on in his 
claim after being terminated from benefits. Burning gas chasing 
down "in-person" contacts makes no sense when you have a family 
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to feed and house when there is no chance far a JOb base 
information you receive through a telephone call. 
Perhaps Appellant should be considered the 
job search in the steel fabrication industry. He hdo 
working in the field for nine years and has been employed cc 
continuously. He has worked for several different companiec 
has acquired what he described as "solid contacts." He re. 
on this knowledge and his contacts to open the doors for 
He calls his contacts, they know of and appreciate the qua. 
of his work. They want to hire him but can't. Going 
person would not increase his chances with these compan. 
These individuals tell him about other prospects. If t: 
seems to be a chance of getting an application or an inten: 
Appellant will go in person. 
Along with these activities, Appellant reads 
ads daily. If the ad asks him to phone, he does! If they 
send a resume, he' 11 send one. In-person contacts in t: 
circumstances could hurt his chances of employment. 
employer might think he can't follow directions or read we 
Uninvited appearances may inconvenience the employer. Tut 
Appeals Referee discounted all such efforts as they were 
made in person. 
All the evidence in the record proves that Appe' 
has acted in good faith and has made reasonable effort 
secure employment and has clearly demonstrated by his acL 
work history, and credible testimony his continuing attacr·· 
to the work force. 
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A. C3se Law Further Supports Appellant's Position. 
The Appeals Referee in her decision relied upon the 
,;oe of Gocke v. Industrial Commission, 420 P.2d 44 (Utah 1966). 
i\ppellant agrees Gocke is good law in Utah. The Gocke case also 
involved a job search issue. The first 2 weeks of Gocke's job 
search consisted of contacting her former employer and inquiring 
about a job with Shoppers' Discount store. Towards the end of 
her first month of unemployment, she made telephone calls to 4 
employers. Ten days later she personally applied at Albertsons. 
She made telephone calls to jewelry stores and near the end of 
the second month she personally applied at Litton Data Systems. 
Then during the last week of the second month she mailed replies 
to newspaper box advertisements. On these facts the Utah 
Supreme Court found that: 
There is nothing in the Referee's 
findings which will support any 
inference that she did not make a 
legitimate attempt to obtain work. 
Based upon her apparent clean work 
record, it seems reasonable and natural 
that she should look to her former 
employer in the first instance for 
re-employment. When that expectation 
did not materialize, the plaintiff 
acted reasonably in seeking employment 
elsewhere by personal application, 
telephone calls and written responses 
to newspaper advertisements. These 
affirmative acts are all in the record 
and the Referee's own findings of fact. 
Such efforts constitute a reasonable 
effort on her part to obtain work. 
Id. at 47 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court held in Gocke 
that: 
The Employment Security Act should be 
liberally construed to best effectuate 
its purposes which include enabling 
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unemployed workers to find 
work and to provide cash benefits 
during periods of unemployment. 
Id. at 46. Certainly the Department has failed to '" ,_,,, 
the Act's purpose in Appellant's case. 
The Gocke decision went on to state: 
Only if it is understood that an 
unemployment compensation law is a 
broad public measure, designed by the 
payment of benefits to check and 
ameliorate the effects of unemployment 
among workers who are able, willing and 
ready to work, will workers be assured 
the reasonable protection which the 
statute has provided for them. The 
same view was expressed by Justice 
Cardozo when he stated: 
"An unemployment law framed in 
such a way that the unemployed who 
look to it will be deprived of 
reasonable protection is one in 
name and nothing more. " See 
Stewart Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 
u.s. 548, at 593, 57 s.ct. 883, 
891, 81 L.Ed. 1279 (1937). 
Id. at 47. 
The Referee further relied on the case of Marvin c" 
Hurd v. Board of Review, 638 P.2d 544 (Utah 1981). Yet th1: 
case fails to address the issue of telephone contacts versus i-
person contacts. Hurd had contacted only three businesses in 
days. This is certainly not the case with Gordon Gray who mai,1 
48 job contacts in 60 days. 
B. The Courts Frown Upon Rigid and Inflexible 
Standards in Job Search Cases. 
The words of the Utah statute do not set a rigid ' 
inflexible standard which can be applied in determ1n. 
eligibility. Rather, it creates a standard of reasonabilitl' 
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the conduct of the claimant in seeking employment, which must be 
,,,,1 ,ermined as an issue of fact by the Department in each 
;nirticular case in accordance with all of the evidence, facts 
and circumstances bearing upon the situation. Brown v. Board of 
Review, 289 N.E.2d 40 (Ill. /l_pp. 1972). 
In the case of Employment Security Administration, 
Board of Appeals v. Smith, 383 A.2d 1108 (Ct. of App. Md. 1978) 
the court found that telephone contacts were reasonable in light 
of the lack of public transportation in the area. Smith had 
contacted 35 businesses over a 7 month period, mostly by 
telephone. The Maryland court found that in light of all the 
circumstances, claimant Smith had made active and reasonable 
efforts to secure employment. 
In Cascade Rolling Mills, Inc. v. Employment Div., 554 
P.2d 549 (Or. App. 1976) the court held that, where for a period 
of less than six weeks after his former employer failed to offer 
claimant work after being injured on the job, the employee 
telephoned one other employer and registered for work with local 
union leaders he had been "actively seeking work." 
In the case of Bloomfield v. Employment Div., 550 P.2d 
1400 (Or. App. 1976) the court held that 1 personal contact and 
"numerous telephone calls and other contacts" were sufficient. 
In Hill v. District Unemployment Compensation Board, 
302 A.2d 226 (D.C. Ct. of App. 1973) the court in similar facts 
found that neither the unemployment compensation statute nor the 
Board's regulations required a claimant to make, as a condition 
precedent, at least three job contacts weekly. The court relied 
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upon claimant's testimony and 
that she had made numerous job 
the 
contacts, and 
- _,-::: 
a const31--; 1 
to obtain employment. The court noted that the Bodrcl'c , 
were based largely upon statements set forth on standar,: 
indicating 12 personal job contacts in 12 weeks. The 
observed that "many of the standard forms, prepared as 
by an Illinois claims taker, contained illegible cryptic 
Id. at 227, 228. 
Similarly with Appellant, he was terminated rroo 
benefits because of a standard form he had improperly filled c· · 
and because of a signed confession that had been drawn up b:' ac 
eligibility worker who told him this was "merely a warning". 
Case law, both in Utah and across the country suppor:, 
Appellant's claim and shows that his job search was reasonab;, 
within the meaning of the law. 
POINT II. 
THE 2 TO 3 NEW IN-PERSON CONTACT RULE IS VOID. 
The 2 to 3 new in-person contact rule as referred 
above is void as it is contrary to Utah law and had not bee 
promulgated as a rule pursuant to Utah law at the time it ··"' 
applied to Appellant. The Department can point to no author::. 
to legitimize the 2 to 3 contact rule. The Utah law ciW 
previously clearly requires a subjective analysis of 1'"" 
claimants efforts in light of their personal circumstances. 
2 to 3 contact rule does not allow such an analysis. The i 
contact rule discounts telephone contacts in violation ot 
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dnd their own "Claimant Guide" which encourages the use of 
10Jephone calls, resumes and other non-personal contacts. Utah 
L'<"pdrtment of Employment Security, Unemployment Insurance 
r'Jaimant Guide, at 7 (February 1982). The 2 to 3 contact rule 
has been criticized by the courts as being overly rigid and 
inflexible, and not in compliance with the Unemployment 
Compensation Act. 
The Utah Administrative Rule-making Act, Utah Code 
Ann. §63-46-1 et which is applicable to every agency of 
the State of Utah sets out the requirements that the state 
agency must follow prior to adoption, amendment, or repeal of 
any rule. These requirements mandate the agency to give prior 
notice of intended action, provide for public comment, and 
perhaps provide a public hearing. The rule must then be filed 
with the state archivist. The rule must then be published in 
the Utah Bulletin and ultimately codified in the Department's 
Rules of Adjudication. The 2 to 3 contact rule had clearly 
never been properly promulgated as a rule in Utah and was thus 
void at the time Respondent applied it against Appellant. It is 
a well understood principle of law that a rule is invalid if the 
agency failed to comply with the requisite rulemaking 
requirements, Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974). 
Appellant is aware that on January 20, 1983, 
subsequent to the application of the rule against Appellant, 
Respondent began the process of promulgating the 2 to 3 new 
in-person contact rule in accordance with Utah's Administrative 
Rule-making Act. The new rule took effect April 5, 1983. It 
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redefines "good faith work search to !nclude, but n ,-
limited to, in person contacts with employers. The 
a rebuttable presumption that a claimant has not muuE 
work search effort if the claimant fails to make a 
minimum number of in-person employer contacts after 
to do so by a local Employment Security off ice. Utah Adrr 
Bull. No. 83-7 at 77 (April 1, 1983). However, even though : 
state has now promulgated such a rule, it was not in effect ,. 
the time Gray's case was adjudicated. Furthermore, this t'L 
violates the Utah unemployment compensation statutes and as sue 
is ultra vires and is thus invalid. 
POINT III. 
GARNISHING 100% OF APPELLANT'S BENEFIT CHECK 
WAS EXCESSIVE. 
As Appellant Gray testified at the hearing, dune 
September, his family's sole source of income was unemployrner.· 
compensation benefits of $166.00 per week. After his benefit' 
were terminated, the family was left with no income in Octobe" 
Claimant has a wife and three children to provide for. 
Grays were not eligible for any form of welfare assistance '' 
there is currently no AFDC-Unemployed Parent program in Gta: 
The agency after reopening Gray's claim withheld 100% of 
weekly benefits in order to recoup the overpayment. 
excessive. The Department has discretion regarding reco 11 P"' 
of overpayments and such discretion should be used wise1·. 
equitably. The Department should take into consideration 
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f 11111 s income and expenses when determining the amount to be 
•i"-rnished. The generally applicable laws of garnishment and 
jrtachment provide for the protection of the unfortunate and 
neerly. Generally one's wages cannot be garnished in excess of 
25t of weekly disposable earnings or to an extent that it would 
drop the debtors wages below minimum wage. 15 U.S.C. §l673(a); 
Utah Code Ann. §70B-5-105 (1953, as amended). In as much as 
unemployment compensation benefits are intended to be a wage 
substitute during times of temporary unemployment, the same 
prohibitions against excessive garnishment of wages should apply 
to unemployment benefits. 
Garnishing 100% of Gray's benefits was draconian in 
this case as it jeopardized his entire family's well-being. 
Respondent made no effort to determine an equitable amount to be 
garnished in light of the Appellant's circumstances. Nor was 
Appellant ever given a chance to discuss his financial 
circumstances in an effort to determine an appropriate amount. 
Thus he has been denied fundamental fairness in this regard and 
has been denied due process of law. 
Virtually all forms of financial assistance received 
from public assistance programs are exempt from collection 
efforts on the part of creditors. 42 u.s.c. §407, 42 u.s.c. 
§1383(d) (1). Furthermore, in instances where recoupment of 
overpayments by the administering agency is allowed, such 
recoupment will most likely be restricted so as to allow for the 
continued survival of those meant to be benefitted by the 
program. This is the case, for example, with recovery of 
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overpayments made under the Aid to 
Children program where recoupment is restricted tc i'J, 
available resources for a household. 42 u.s.c. ';6021>!' 
(Supp. 1975 to 1981) The reasoning behind these laws s1,,,, 
self-evident. In many cases, and certainly in Appellant'• 
unemployment compensation is the family's lifeline. It l" 
only source of income and has many of the es sent ... 
characteristics of public assistance. Thus the Department ::, 
abused its discretion by failing to consider the financa_ 
circumstances of Appellant in determining the amount of tcs 
garnishment. 
POINT IV. 
THE DEPARTMENT'S PRACTICE OF TERMINATING 
APPELLANT GRAY'S BENEFITS WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE 
AND A HEARING DENIED HIM DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
Appellant's claim was terminated two days after he ha: 
been called in for an eligibility review. At that time, 
listed three employers' names on his review form. Appell a:,: 
Gray later testified that he had listed only his "best contacts 
and "most positive" prospects. He listed his prior employers' 
Williamson's Trucking, Allen Steel, and O.J. Industries. Tb 
was not the extent of his job search by any means as he tried' 
explain. Yet at the eligibility review he was not given ' 
opportunity to explain. He was merely directed to sigc 
statement written by Department Representative D. 
confessing to an inadequate job search. Appellant 
the hearing that he felt fearful and intimidated by 
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,,, c1 r'Jn tat i.on and didn't i:ully read the statement before signing 
it. At his hearing he testified that he disagreed with much of 
.,.-;t was written on the form. Appellant never admitted to only 
"ntacting those 3 firms. On his appeal request Appellant made 
Lhis clear. His testimony at the hearing detailed his work 
search activities. He testified that Dean threatened him with 
termination of benefits if he didn't contact 3 employers per 
week. Appellant felt this threat included failure to sign the 
"Statement Regarding Claims for Benefits." 
Two days after this encounter, Appellant's benefits 
were terminated, totally out of the blue and without notice or 
opportunity to clarify the facts. 
This scenario illustrates precisely the reasons why 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut struck 
down an identical practice in that state. 
Fusari, 364 F.Supp. 922 (D.Conn. 1973). 
See Steinberg v. 
In Connecticut, a recipient was required to make 
bi-weekly visits to the Unemployment Compensation Department to 
fill out a "Continued Claim for Unemployment Compensation" upon 
which he would swear to his availability for work and his 
"reasonable efforts" to find work. He also would fill out a 
"Continued Claim Work Effort Information Form." These papers 
were then presented to an employee of the Department; if no 
questions were raised, he was paid. If the Department employee 
raised an issue of possible disqualification, the claimant was 
sent in for a "seated interview." He was then interviewed by a 
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"Fact Finding Examiner," who sought to ascertain facts as 
possible disqualification. If the examiner decided Ui;i· 
claimant had not conducted a diligent job search, the r: !. 
was not given his check and was told that he would 
written notification. A letter was then sent out under •· 
signature of the office manager stating the reasons 
termination. 
The Steinberg court held that the "seated 
system did not provide sufficient procedural due proces 2 
Claimants were provided no advance notice of the interview, 0, 
of the precise issues involved, and consequently had ITT 
opportunity to either prepare their arguments or preser.'. 
witnesses on their behalf. Nor were claimants provided with ac 
opportunity to confront adverse witnesses; no opportunity wa 0 
provided to consult with counsel. 
the Connecticut court enjoined 
practice. 
Finding due process lacking, 
the Department from thl' 
This case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court 
Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379 (1975) who remanded the cas, 
in light of the fact that the Connecticut Legislature hac 
enacted major revisions, some of which were designed 
alleviate problems that the lower court had identified. 
The comparison between Utah's practices 
Connecticut's is quite obvious. Gray was terminated withe' 
prior notice or a Goldberg v. Kelly hearing. He was oc 
provided an adequate opportunity to present his arguments 
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the additional information that he had. He was merely 
'"11mrnarily terminated from benefits. 
This termination has caused his family great hardship. 
'\s a family unit they were not eligible for any form of public 
financial assistance in Utah. They have lost their home, Gray's 
family has moved in with neighbors and Gray himself is out on 
the street. It was exactly these results that the federal and 
state unemployment compensation laws were enacted to prevent. 
See, e.g. Java v. California Department of Human Resources 
Development, 317 F.Supp. 875 (N.D. Cal. 1970). 
In Java, supra, the court was faced with a situation 
analagous to Gray's. The California Department of Human 
Resources Development had initially found the claimant eligible 
for benefits. After this initial determination of eligibility, 
the claimant's former employer objected to the award of benefits 
and the claimant was terminated without a Goldberg v. Kelly type 
hearing. The Java court found that: 
An entitlement to unemployment 
insurance benefits or welfare payments 
is no different from the due process 
standpoint than an entitlement to a 
pension or a form subsidy, or a 
professional license to practice. Once 
a person's qualifications for the 
benefit is shown, it cannot be 
arbitrarily denied, or withdrawn, 
without due process standards being 
fulfilled. 
Java, 317 F.Supp. at 877. The court went on to find that: 
[T] he situation of the unemployed 
person herein is every bit as 
lamentable from the legal standpoint as 
that of the welfare client in Kelly v. 
Wyman, 294 F.Supp. 893 (D.C. 1968) and 
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the garnishee in Sniadach v. Familv 
Finance Corp. of Bay View, et al., 395 
U.S. 337, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.2d 349 
( 1969). 
Id. at 878. 
The Java court determined the California proee,1 111 ,_ 
be defective on constitutional and statutory grounds. 
unemployment compensation benefits are "due" upon the initu_ 
determination of eligibility, termination of these benefit• 
without a pre-termination hearing violates due proce>, 
Furthermore, because claimants were denied benefits for a media: 
of seven weeks while the hearing process ran its course, tr,e 
California procedure violated 42 u.s.c. §503 (a) (1) WhlC' 
mandates that a state's program be "reasonably calculated t' 
insure full payment of unemployment compensation when due." 
Java was affirmed on appeal to the United Stateo 
I 
I 
Supreme Court on the grounds that termination of benefits durir,:, 
the 7 to 10 week period a claimant had to wait for the hearc:: 
process to finish and benefits to be reinstated violated 4: 
U.S.C. §503 (a) (1) in that the California procedure was net 
"reasonably calculated to insure full payment of unemployrnen· 
compensation when due." California Department of Huma:; 
Resources Development v. Java, 402 U.S. 121 (1971). 
Respondent's procedures have the same shortcomings 0 = 
those found in Java. After Gray was initially determine: 
eligible for benefits, he was terminated without prior W· 1 
and without a prior due process hearing. To add to t' 
flagrant violation of Gray's rights, his termination 
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•troactive co a month prior to notice and he was charged with 
1n for using benefits which he had no way of knowing 
.•' •,.ias not entitled to use. Like the Java court, this court 
should enjoin Respondent from terminating Gray's benefits again 
:or any reason other than exhaustion of benefits without first 
affording him a Goldberg v. Kelly due process hearing. Thus 
Respondent's procedure violated Gray's due process rights to 
notice and a fair hearing as well as 42 U.S.C. §503(a) (1) which 
requires that unemployment compensation benefits be provided 
"when due." 
POINT V. 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW'S DETERMINATION 
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS. 
IS 
AND 
NOT 
IS 
The role of the Utah Supreme Court under Section 
35-4-lO(i) of the Utah Employment Security Act is to: 
[S]ustain the determination of the 
Board of Review, unless the record 
clearly and persuasively proves the 
action of the Board was arbitrary, 
capricious and unreasonable. 
Specifically, as a matter of law, the 
determination was wrong; because only 
the opposite conclusion could be drawn 
from the facts. 
Continental Oil Company v. Board of Review of Industrial 
Commission, 568 P.2d 727, 729-30 (Utah 1977). 
As stated above, Respondent has deprived Appellant of 
his sole means of support for himself and his family through a 
rigid and inflexible job search requirement. Appellant made 48 
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employer contacts over a 60 day period, an 
the reasonable JOb search efforts being upheld en 
Yet he has been denied benefits by Respondent because 11, :,· 
make 2 to 3 new in-person employer contacts each week. 
above, Respondent's requirement is void because it violates 
Employment Security statutes and because it had not 
promulgated under Utah's Administrative Rule-making Act at ... 
time it was applied against Appellant. Thus, Respondert'. 
deprivation of Appellant's benefits for failure to meet 
invalid requirement was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable. 
Respondent also violated Appellant's due proceso 
rights to notice and a pre-termination hearing. In additio,, 
Respondent violated 42 U.S.C. §503(a) (1) by failing to inm' 
that benefits were provided when due. These acts are aL 
arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable. 
Finally, Respondent has caused hardships to Appelia·· 
which far exceed any wrong which Respondent could e'"' 
conceivably find in Appellant's actions. Appellant has lost h:. 
home, his wife and family have been forced to move in with ' 
neighbor, and Appellant has been forced to live on the 
All of these hardships have resulted because of Respondent' 
arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable application of 
inflexible and invalid standard. This Court shou:i.d strike .oc 
and enjoin Respondent's illegal practices, reverse Respondc 
findings, and award full benefits to the Appellant, 
Gray. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant Gray has presented copious evidence as proof 
f his diligent job search efforts that demonstrate his 
attachment to the labor market. Appellant's actions 
fully comply with the requirements of Utah law. Utah law did 
not require the 2 to 3 new in-person contacts per week when 
Gray's claim was terminated. This rule was void as it 
had not been legally promulgated. Furthermore, it remains void 
even after promulgation because it is in conflict with Utah 
statutory law as interpreted by case law. 
Furthermore, the 100% offset (garnishment) of 
Appellant's benefits was excessive under the circumstances and 
thus was arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of agency 
discretion. Finally, Appellant was terminated from benefits in 
violation of law as he was not provided prior notice and a due 
process hearing, and because this practice of the Respondent was 
not reasonably calculated to insure full payment of unemployment 
compensation benefits when due. 
Appellant therefore requests that he be reimbursed for 
all benefits denied him and that the Department be enjoined from 
terminating his claim again for any reason other than exhaustion 
of benefits without first providing him with due process of law. 
DATED this day of Ape; l , 1983. 
Respectfully submitted, 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that two true and ccrrnr• 
the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT was mailed first-class 
prepaid to the following: 
Floyd G. Astin 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
The Industrial Commission of Utah 
Department of Employment Security 
P. O. Box 11249 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
K. Allan Zabel 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
The Industrial Commission of Utah 
Department of Employment Security 
P. O. Box 116 0 0 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
DATED this day of April, 1983. 
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